US–China Rivalry Over African Minerals Intensifies Strategic Competition

This rivalry goes beyond trade volumes or diplomatic visits. It is about who controls the supply chains for the minerals essential to batteries, semiconductors, electric vehicles and renewable energy technologies. For Africa, this dynamic presents both opportunity and complexity.

Why minerals matter now

The global demand for critical minerals — including lithium, cobalt, nickel, manganese and rare earths — has surged as climate transition and digitalisation accelerate. Unlike oil or gas, most of these materials are not yet widely substitutable or recyclable at scale, making their supply chains chokepoints in themselves.

Africa holds a significant share of this bounty:

• Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) alone provides over 60 percent of global cobalt supply.

• Zimbabwe and South Africa host significant lithium and platinum group metals.

• Namibia, Ghana, Mali and Madagascar offer lithium, rare earths and graphite deposits.

These resources underpin everything from electric vehicle batteries to wind turbine magnets, making them vital to both industrial and defence sectors.

China’s entrenched presence

China’s engagement in Africa’s mineral sector started decades ago and is now deeply rooted:

1. Chinese state-owned enterprises and private firms have executed long-term contracts across the continent, particularly in the DRC and Zambia.

2. China dominates processing capacity for many minerals — especially cobalt refining and rare earth separation — creating supply-chain leverage beyond extraction.

3. Infrastructure for mining logistics — roads, rail and ports — often comes bundled with Chinese financing and construction.

This approach creates lock-in effects: African ores move to Chinese factories, where value is embedded before export to global markets.

US strategic pivot

In contrast, the United States has historically lagged in direct minerals engagement, relying on market mechanisms and private sector actors. But strategic shifts in recent years reflect a new sense of urgency:

• The US has classified certain minerals as essential to national security and supply-chain resilience.

• Washington has launched initiatives to diversify supply, including partnerships in Africa, Latin America and Australia.

• Policy actions now link mineral security to broader geopolitical competition, especially with China.

US efforts emphasise due diligence, environmental standards and governance, often tied to development finance and trade policies that seek to build longer-term institutional frameworks.

What this rivalry looks like on the ground

In practical terms, the US–China contest plays out in several domains:

Contracts and concessions: Chinese firms often move quickly with capital and bilateral support, securing early access to deposits. US engagement is more selective, focusing on strategic priority metals and transparent investment environments.

Processing capacity: China’s dominance in mineral processing remains a structural advantage. Even when African countries export ore to global markets, much of the value-add occurs in Chinese facilities. US strategies include encouraging local processing capacity through investment and technology partnerships.

Standards and governance: US engagement emphasises environmental, social and governance (ESG) criteria, local content and revenue transparency. This aligns with African demands for better value capture at the local level.

Finance and risk: Chinese state-backed financing often comes with fewer conditionalities but higher geopolitical strings, while Western capital may be slower but tied to governance reforms.

Opportunities for Africa

Africa is not a passive arena. The rivalry gives African governments leverage to negotiate better terms:

• Countries can attract multiple bids for exploration and development.

• Governments can demand stronger local participation, beneficiation and technology transfer.

• Regional initiatives like the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) aim to build internal value chains rather than export raw ore alone.

These dynamics allow African states to push for outcomes that spread benefits across their economies rather than concentrating them externally.

Risks and challenges

The competition also brings risks. Pressure to “pick sides” can force policy concessions that undermine long-term development goals. Rapid investment inflows, if not governed well, can exacerbate governance challenges and environmental harm.

More fundamentally, Africa’s ability to convert mineral wealth into industrial growth depends on domestic capacity — policy clarity, infrastructure, skills and local finance — rather than the identity of external partners.

US–China rivalry over African minerals is a defining feature of today’s geopolitical economy. For Africa, it presents a rare opportunity to attract capital, technology and market access. But to turn extractive potential into sustainable growth, African policy choices must emphasise value addition, responsible governance and regional strategic alignment.

In this competition, the real winners will be the countries that use global interest in their resources to build lasting industrial foundations — not just sell raw materials.

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